A. INTRODUCTION
It is generally accepted that an appeal court is not normally the place for a full rehearing of the case argued at first instance. The limited role of the appeal court needs to be particularly remembered in child protection cases, which tend of their nature to call for assessments of credibility in matters of high disputation, and for close evaluations of statutory tests which, however precisely expressed, always demand judgments of the nicest character.
Though society rightly condemns child neglect and abuse in the highest terms, courts asked to make orders for the protection of vulnerable children are in reality rarely faced with the choice between good and evil, or with a situation in which there can only be one acceptable outcome. Instead, determining the outcome of a child protection case usually calls for an assessment of a range of options, each of which may carry serious drawbacks, in an attempt to identify which option is the best -which all too often means the least worstfor the particular child in the circumstances that actually exist. In many, if not most, cases a different outcome from the one determined at first instance might well be as rational, reasonable and defensible as the decision actually made. For these reasons the long-recognised need for appeal courts to afford a certain degree of deference to the decisions made by the first instance tribunal is especially important in child protection cases. But identifying the precise level of deference that is appropriate in any individual case is a matter of some difficulty, not least because that level may differ depending upon the nature of the judgment being appealed against, and of the level of the court hearing the appeal. 1 The most authoritative recent discussion of appellate deference in the context of child protection cases is to be found in the Supreme Court's decision in the English case of Re B (A Child). 2 The substantive question in that case was whether a care order made under s.31(2) of the Children Act 1989 and designed to lead to the adoption of a three year old child should stand. The order having been made, the primary dispute before the Supreme Court (and the one central to the present discussion) concerned the boundaries beyond which it would be wrong for an appellate court to set aside the decision of the court of first instance. The purpose of this article is neither to analyse the facts of that English case (as complex as they are tragic) nor to explore the English legislation at issue there (very different from the Scottish legislation): a comparative analysis must await another day. Rather, utilising the structures suggested by the Supreme Court to the issue, this article aims to explore how appellate deference operates in Scotland. The principles derived from that exploration will then be applied to the special context of the children's hearing system in Scotland -where appeals do not go beyond the Court of Sessionin order to determine whether that system's peculiarities demand any modification of the traditional approach.
Scotland encapsulates the separation of the two questions, by requiring two different tribunals to provide the answers. 7 The threshold question of whether there are grounds upon which the state can legitimately interfere in a child's upbringing falls exclusively to the sheriff if the grounds upon which a child is referred to a children's hearing are challenged or not understood (i.e. if it is not accepted that the threshold has been crossed); the outcome question of whether, once the threshold is crossed, an order ought to be made, and if so on what terms, is a question to be answered at first instance by the children's hearing. The establishing of grounds never legally requires the hearing to make an order and it always retains the right to discharge the referral. 8 So the "threshold" analysis fits the Scottish as readily as it does the English approach in child protection cases. The importance of Re B (A Child) is not that it legitimated this long-established terminology but that it affirmed the importance of recognising "the different intellectual exercise which is in play in each of these contexts because that will dictate the proper approach of the appellate court to a challenge about the correctness of a judge's decision". 9 Additionally, the Supreme Court emphasised that the judicial decision-making process has considerably more stages than would be implied by the terminology of a "two-stage test". Lord Neuberger 10 broke the threshold question itself down into three stages: the first instance tribunal is required (i) to make findings of fact, (ii) to identify the proper meaning of the statutory test, and (iii) to determine whether the facts meet the test. The outcome decision (described in Re B (A Child) as "the welfare decision") becomes therefore the fourth question for the court (or, in Scotland, the children's hearing) once the threhold question has been answered affirmatively. 11 An appeal may be taken 7 This was famously described by Lord President Hope in Sloan v B 1991 SLT 530 at 548E as the "genius" of the system. 8 Children's Hearings (Scotland) Act 2011, s.119(3)(b). See S v Locality Reporter Manager 2014 Fam LR 109 at [7] . 9 [2013] UKSC 33, per Lord Kerr at [107] . 10 At [50] . 11 Both Lord Kerr (at [107] ) and Lady Hale (at [199] ) describe the process as having three rather than four stages, but they do not address findings in law (Lord Neuberger's second stage) which were not at issue in Re B.
against the first instance tribunal's decision on each of these four issues and the considerations justifying appellate deference differ at each stage.
C. THE FOUR STAGE ANALYSIS a. Stage one: challenging findings in fact
First instance tribunals have long been assumed across the common law world to have unique advantages in making findings in fact that cannot be reproduced on appeal and which therefore require an appeal court to defer to such findings. In Clarke v Edinburgh and District Tramways Co, 12 Lord Shaw of Dunfermline said this:
"In my opinion, the duty of an appellate Court ... is for each Judge of it to put to himself, as I now do in this case, the question, Am I -who sit here without those advantages, sometimes broad and sometimes subtle, which are the privilege of the Judge who heard and tried the case -in a position, not having those privileges, to come to a clear conclusion that the Judge who had them was plainly wrong? If I cannot be satisfied in my own mind that the Judge with those privileges was plainly wrong, then it appears to me to be my duty to defer to his judgment".
The advantages adverted to in this dictum are specified more explicitly by Lord MacMillan in Thomas v Thomas, 13 which is now the locus classicus for deference to the fact-finder, at least in Scotland:
"The appellate Court has before it only the printed record of the evidence. What is lacking is evidence of the demeanour of the witnesses, their candour or their partisanship, and all the incidental elements so difficult to describe which make up the atmosphere of an actual trial. This assistance the trial Judge possesses in reaching his conclusion, but it is not available to the appellate Court. So far as the 12 1919 SC(HL) 35 at p. 37. 13 1947 SC(HL) 45 at p.59.
case stands on paper it not infrequently happens that a decision either way may seem equally open. When this is so, and it may be said of the present case, then the decision of the trial Judge, who has enjoyed the advantages not available to the appellate Court, becomes of paramount importance and ought not to be disturbed".
In other words, appellate deference should be shown because the judge at first instance is quite simply in a better position than an appeal court to assess the credibility of witnesses who appear before him or her. 14 The assumption upon which this approach is based, that the taking into account of demeanour and atmosphere is of genuine assistance in determining credibility, finds little support in psychological literature 15 but it is a deep-rooted belief in our legal culture. 16 There are, however, other and stronger reasons -based on pragmatism rather than principle -justifying appellate deference to first instance findings of fact. In Re B (A Child) 17 Lord Neuberger said that the appellate deference traditionally shown to first instance findings of fact:
"can also be justified on grounds of policy (parties should put forward their best case on the facts at trial and not regard the potential to appeal as a second chance), cost (appeals on fact can be expensive), delay (appeals on fact often take a long time to get on), and practicality (in many cases, it is very hard to ascertain the facts with confidence, so a second, different, opinion is no more likely to be right than the first)." For these reasons, Lord Neuberger concluded that the appellate tribunal will interfere with first instance findings in fact "only in a rare case". Lord Kerr put 16 Though accepting the lack of scientific evidence to support the special reliability of the assessment of witnesses made by the judge at first instance, Lord Bingham, op. cit. at p. 30, nevertheless said that "the trial judge's immediate contact with the witnesses and the unfolding drama of litigation nevertheless gives him insights denied to those who come later. It is the advantage which the journalist on the scene at the time enjoys over the historian. And even if the judge may be wrong, noone else can be sure of being right". The last comment is unchallengeable, but the same cannot be said for the implication that the journalist's insight is to be better trusted than the historian's. 17 the matter rather more strongly when he stated that "unless the finding is insupportable on any objective analysis it will be immune from review". 18 Both dicta confirm that appellate deference at this first stage is of a high level and without being any more precise than that, it can be said with some confidence that an appellate tribunal will not interfere merely because its reading of the evidence would have inclined it to a different conclusion on the facts. So in Re A (Children) 19 the judge at first instance had found on the evidence that the deliberate infliction of injury upon children by their mother had not been proved. The Court of Appeal held that while the judge could have found, on the evidence, that the injuries were non-accidental, he had fully explained why he had not so found and so the Court of Appeal could not overturn his decision just because the opposite decision had been open to him on the facts as he found them.
In a quite different context (whether a disposition of land amounted to a gratuitous alienation) Lord Reed reiterated the traditional approach in 20 where he concluded that: "In the absence of some other identifiable error … a material error of law, or the making of a critical finding of fact which has no basis in the evidence, or a demonstrable misunderstanding of relevant evidence, or a demonstrable failure to consider relevant evidence, an appellate court will interfere with the findings of fact made by a trial judge only if it is satisfied that his decision cannot reasonably be explained or justified". 21 He went on to point out that that approach was consistent both with existing So the notions of "right" and "wrong" take on artificial meanings in this context.
Henderson v Foxworth Investments Ltd,
A "right" answer is an answer that is supported by legal authority rather than one that is intellectually defensible. The rule of law itself requires that the legal system provides a concrete answer to every legal question -which becomes the "right" answer -with every other possible answer, rational or irrational, order, that is contrary to existing authority can expect to be overruled 32 unless the existing authority is itself overturned; any first instance tribunal that determines a legal dispute about which there is no existing authority may hope that a higher court agrees with its determination because of the strength of its reasoning, but can expect no deference to be shown by an appellate tribunal that disagrees with the determination.
c. Stage three: challenging evaluative judgments
Once the facts are found, and the correct meaning of the statutory test has been identified, the first instance tribunal must then go on to the third stage of the threshold question, which is to apply the statutory test to the facts as found. This is the stage at which the question is, in its fundaments: Has the threshold been crossed? So for example if the statutory test is that the child "is likely to suffer significant harm", 33 the decisions that require to be made are whether the established facts indicate such a "likelihood", and whether the harm that is assessed to be likely can properly be characterised as "significant". Indeed, Neuberger suggested "evaluation" as the appropriate characterisation. 37 There is unlikely to be any substantive difference in these usages for they are all intended, first, to indicate that what is being asked of the judge is not to find a fact but to make a judgment about that fact, and secondly to differentiate, at least at the conceptual level, the first instance tribunal's decision at this third stage of the threshold question from the decisions at the previous two stages and from the decision at the outcome stage. The word "evaluation" will be used in this article because it seems to the present author to encapsulate best what each Justice is referring to: the process by which the first instance tribunal weighs up whether the facts satisfy the statutory language or not, by making a judgment call on whether something is "likely" or "serious" or "significant".
The justification for appellate deference to evaluative judgments made by the first instance tribunal is not located in the first instance judge's relationship with the witnesses. Rather it comes from a recognition that the concepts at issue, such as "likelihood" or "significance", are not absolutes: they are of their nature matters of judgment rather than of definition. Words and phrases such as these, common throughout the statute book, require -indeed are designed to require 38 -a professional judgment to be made in the context of the facts as found, and it is in the nature of professional judgment that there is not a single definitive answer but rather a range (sometimes wide, sometimes narrow) of answers each one of which can be acceptable or justified. What is likely and significant to one judge may be unlikely and insignificant to another and yet both judges may be right -at least in the sense that neither judge is necessarily wrong. opposing, evaluations within the acceptable range, any appellate tribunal that wishes to overrule a first instance tribunal needs more justification for doing so than that it would itself evaluate the facts differently.
The traditional approach to evaluations has been to treat them in the same way as outcome decisions and so, as we will see in that context below, to permit a "generous ambit of reasonable disagreement" to first instance tribunals, with the result that a decision will not be overruled merely because the appellate tribunal considers that it is mistaken, but only when the lower decision can be characterised as "plainly wrong". However, the Supreme Court, though accepting that an evaluation requires the exercise of judgment, unanimously rejected the notion that the evaluation of the first instance tribunal needs to be shown to be "plainly wrong" to be successfully appealed against.
Distinguishing between an evaluative judgment on the one hand and a judgment of a "discretionary" nature on the other hand (that is one at the outcome stage), Lord Wilson stated that the language of a "generous ambit of reasonable disagreement"
"seems apt only to the review of an exercise of discretion, as in G v G 39 … But it is generally better to allow adjectives to speak for themselves without adverbial support. What does 'plainly' add to 'wrong'? Either the word adds nothing or it serves to treat the determination under challenge with some slight extra level of generosity apt to one which is discretionary but not to one which is evaluative. Like all other members of the court, I consider that appellate review of a determination whether the threshold is crossed should be conducted by reference simply to whether it was wrong". 40 Lady Hale came to the same conclusion by focusing on the statutory basis for any appeal:
"In relation to evaluating whether the threshold has been crossed, we are all agreed that the proper appellate test is whether the trial judge was "wrong" to reach the conclusion he did. This is the test laid down in CPR 52.11(3) and there is no reason why it should not apply in this context. 'Plainly' adds nothing helpful". 41 It seems then that, in the view of the Supreme Court, the notion of there being a "generous ambit of reasonable disagreement" simply does not apply to evaluations: like decisions on the law there is only one right answer, with every other possible answer being wrong. The lower court's answer might be rational, reasonable and justifiable but that is not the question for the appeal court, which is whether it was "right" or "wrong". There is however some artificiality with this approach since words like "significant", "serious" and "likely" are not in their nature absolute, and so do not lend themselves to a "right or wrong" answer. While the rule of law itself requires that we accept exactly this artificiality in relation to a question of law (which, as we saw above, is frequently a matter of policy and judgment as much as a matter of absolute definition), there is no similar imperative to accept such artificiality in the context of evaluation. To say that evaluations, like questions of law, are either right or wrong is true only in the sense that the first instance tribunal must come to a definite conclusion as to whether the threshold has been crossed or not, just as it must come to a definite conclusion on the law, but applying the same sleight of hand to conclude from that that there is only one correct evaluation, just as there can be only one correct legal position, would mean that, as with findings of law, no appellate deference at all is to be shown. Yet the Supreme Court, unanimous on this point, did not follow its own logic and each Justice accepted that some deference was appropriate with evaluations, less certainly than for findings in fact, but more than for findings of law. Three of the justices seemed to accept that an appellate court cannot overturn all first instance decisions it disagreed with 42 and neither of the others said that the 41 Ibid at [202] . See also Lord Clarke at [139] . 42 Lord Kerr at [110] talked of "a degree of reticence" that needed to be shown by appellate tribunals asked to overturn first instance evaluations; Lord Neuberger said at [60] that "the reasons which justify a very high hurdle for an appeal on an issue of primary fact apply, often with somewhat less force, in relation to an appeal on an issue of evaluation". Lady Hale had serious doubts as to whether the threshold in Re B (A Child) had been crossed, but notwithstanding that she felt "driven to the conclusion that this court is not in a position to interfere with the judge's finding that the threshold was crossed in this case" (at [214] ).
appellate court could: in other words an evaluative decision might not be "wrong" even although the Supreme Court itself would have come to a different conclusion. The overall result remains, however, a lowering of the level of appellate deference to evaluative decisions from that which had previously been assumed.
The outcome of the Supreme Court's decision on this point seems to be based on two considerations, neither of which has much resonance in Scotland. The first is that the "right or wrong" binary is necessitated by the fact that the Civil Procedure Rules lay down as the general ground of appeal that the decision was "wrong". This argument does not work in Scotland where the ground of appeal is either not legislatively specified (as with appeals against permanence orders) or expressed in an evaluative rather than an absolutist manner (as with appeals to the sheriff from decisions of the children's hearings). 43 The second consideration is that the intellectual exercise asked of first instance tribunals making evaluative judgments is seen by the Supreme Court as being closer to making findings of law (where appellate deference is low) than to making findings in fact (where appellate deference is high, being encapsulated in the "plainly wrong" test whose continuing authority in Scotland was confirmed in The importance of the point is that the Supreme Court in Re B (A Child) held that the "generous ambit of reasonable disagreement" test for appellate deference (the true meaning, according to Lord Fraser in G v G, 57 of the "plainly wrong" standard) applied only to outcome decisions that could be described as "discretionary", while other outcome decisions were to be accorded a degree of deference on a par with that accorded to the evaluative part of the threshold decision. Lord Wilson felt "driven to jettison the principles in G v G", 58 seeing no conceptual difference between the judgment the first instance tribunal was asked to make at the evaluative stage of the threshold question and the judgment required of that tribunal at the outcome stage. This led him to conclude that the level of appellate deference ought to be the same:
"There is, therefore, an attractive symmetry between the criterion for review of a determination of whether the threshold is crossed and that for review of a determination of whether a care order should be made.
In each case it is no more and no less than whether the determination is wrong". 59
To this conclusion both Lord Neuberger 60 and Lord Clarke 61 adhere. of state protection. The important element of "discretion", in this understanding of the word, is that it implies a power of choice. 71 However, in few areas where judges exercise discretion is their choice completely free, and it is certainly not in relation to either private law or public law disputes relating to children. In both types of case the tribunal is constrained by the requirement to regard the welfare of the child as the paramount consideration; additionally in public law (child protection) cases the tribunal is constrained to choose an outcome that is proportionate to the legitimate aim it seeks to achieve. 72 That there is no wholly free choice has long been recognised. 73 But choices still have to be made both as to the factors that are relevant to welfare and as to the weight each factor is to be accorded. Whether the weighing of the relevant factors in a child protection case is best described as exercising discretion or as making a judgment is less important -for the process clearly has elements of both 74 -than the fact that the required weighing is a matter for the first instance tribunal The justification for appellate deference, and the setting of its level, is therefore found not in the fact that a decision is "discretionary" but in the fact that it requires the making of choices between outcomes with which rational and reasonable people may disagree. 76 We see here an important constitutional doctrine at play. Because an outcome needs to be determined in circumstances in which there will seldom be only one rational and reasonable outcome, it becomes of crucial importance to identify who is lawfully appointed to determine the outcome: who, in other words, has been given the power to make the appropriate choice by Parliament. 78 Any appellate body that simply substitutes its own judgment for those that it disagrees with is similarly subverting an important constitutional principle: that decisions are to be made by the bodies chosen by Parliament to However, the Court ignores a crucial distinction between the two types of decision and one, indeed, that suggests that appellate oversight ought if anything to be stronger (and appellate deference correspondingly weaker) for evaluative decisions than for outcome decisions. The difference is this. A threshold evaluation has the potential to create a precedent, and it follows that the higher courts have a direct interest in ensuring that evaluations are calibrated properly, and orientated to the direction in which they want the law to develop. 80 An outcome decision on the other hand, even when made by the highest court in the land, is the outcome that is considered best for the particular child, and that outcome itself can never (unlike the law whose application has determined it) have any precedential value because what is best for one child in one case tells us nothing about whether the same outcome would be best for another child in the necessarily different context of any other case. The appellate tribunal therefore has no ability to develop the law by either upholding or interfering with the first instance outcome decision: it has, in other words, less standing to interfere. This being so, the level of deference that it should show to first instance decisions on outcome must be at least as high as for evaluative decisions: the outcome determined by the body 79 It was accepted in R (Evans) v Attorney General that this principle could be reversed by explicit statutory provision, if it is "crystal clear": per Lord Neuberger at [58] . A Scottish example would be the power of the children's hearing to review the making under ss.38 or 39 of the Children's Hearings (Scotland) Act 2011 of a child protection order, which can be brought to an end whenever the reviewing body, in its own judgment, considers that the grounds for its making are not made outirrespective of the fact that a sheriff has previously determined that they were made out: see s. chosen by Parliament to exercise judgment should stand until such time as the outcome is shown to be beyond the generous ambit of reasonable disagreement: in other words, that it was plainly wrong.
D. APPEALS FROM THE CHILDREN'S HEARING
In Scotland, the most important decision-maker in child protection cases is the children's hearing, for that body deals with the vast majority of such cases. 81 The hearing has no role in threshold decisions (at least in relation to the grounds upon which the child is referred to a hearing) but is concerned primarily with determining the outcome of the case. The hearing has discretion in determining the outcome, in the sense of having a choice of whether to make, vary or continue a compulsory supervision order or not, and its terms. In making its choice, the hearing must exercise judgment, but that judgment is highly constrained, as is the judgment of a court asked to make a permanence order or an adoption order, by both the welfare principle and the ECHR-derived need for proportionality.
a.Appeals from outcome decisions of children's hearings
The hearing's outcome decisions may be appealed under s.154 of the Children's Hearings (Scotland) Act 2011 to the sheriff, though it is not completely self-evident that the deference a sheriff dealing with such an appeal ought to show to the hearing's decision is governed by the same principles as those discussed above. There are at least two considerations peculiar to dispositive decisions by children's hearings which carry their own implications.
First, the hearing is not a court of law but is instead a quasi-judicial tribunal, with lawful powers of course but staffed by laypersons with little formal legal training. This might suggest that appellate deference, based at least to some 81 It is true that the most extreme forms of state interference in family life, which involve a child being permanently removed from its parents, can be effected only by order of the sheriff or the Court of Session, by means of either a permanence order or an adoption order under the Adoption and Children (Scotland) Act 2007. However, the power of a children's hearing to interfere in family life is not to be under-estimated. For a detailed account, see Norrie, Children's Hearings in Scotland (3 rd edn., 2013).
extent on an understanding of common professional courtesy underpinned by a shared training and experiential background, is less appropriate than it is with appeals from courts of law. However, "professional courtesy" has been recognised as a not particularly solid justification for appellate deference, 82 and deference has been extended to decisions of other lay tribunals. 83 Much more important is the relationship with the child and other actors in the dispute developed by the first instance tribunal, as recognised by Lord Wilson in Re B (A Child). 84 While he was talking within the context of the peculiar role demanded of a "family judge", more intimate with the actors in the dispute than in most other types of court action, these comments apply with even greater force to children's hearings in Scotland where the whole design of the system aims to ensure that a much more "hands-on" approach to adjudication is adopted by this lay panel than is possible in any court of law.
Secondly, unlike with general appeals from a court of first instance to an appeal court, appeals from a children's hearing to a sheriff have a ground of appeal laid down in the governing legislation. This changes the nature of the debate, for the issue becomes less whether the limits of appellate deference (wherever they are set) have been exceeded and more whether the statutory ground for appeal has been made out. This indeed is the basis of the judgments of Lord Clarke and Lady Hale in Re B (A Child): 85 for both, the primary reason why appellate tribunals should not limit themselves to overturning only decisions they consider "plainly wrong" was that the (English)
Civil Procedure Rules provide that an appeal court can overrule a lower court's decision that it considers to be, simply, "wrong". The statutory test for appeals to sheriffs from dispositive decisions of the children's hearing is different: under s.156 of the 2011 Act an appeal must be rejected (and the imperative is to be noted) if the sheriff considers the decision being appealed against to be "justified". So a sheriff needs to ask, not whether the outcome was "wrong" but whether it was "justified". These are, conceptually, entirely different questions. 86 and by the Court of Session. 87 The word has therefore been used both judicially and legislatively in contexts which lack the absolutist connotations of a "right or wrong" binary. While the hearing must make its decision as to which outcome it considers to be best for the child, that assessment is, in its fundaments, a matter of opinion -reached by the exercise of judgment rather by a search for absolute truths. If the hearing decides that Outcome A is the best for the child, it is nothing to the point that either another hearing or a sheriff considers Outcome B to be the best. The question for the sheriff is whether, in the exercise of its judgment, the hearing chose an outcome that can be justified. The judgment reached as to what is the best option can seldom be adjudged right or wrong but can always be adjudged supportable or insupportable. It follows that in determining whether an outcome decision of a children's hearing is "justified", the sheriff needs to show a greater level of appellate deference than was allowed by the Supreme Court in circumstances where the statutory ground of appeal was that the decision appealed against was "wrong".
b. The meaning of "not justified"
That the hearing's decision was "not justified" has been the statutory ground for appeal since the commencement of the hearings system, 88 and in that time has been subject to some judicial analysis, but so far not beyond sheriff court Mowat, discussing the extent to which sheriffs ought to show appellate deference to the hearing, said this:
"A sheriff should not interfere with the determination [of the hearing] simply because he felt another form of treatment might be preferable … Accordingly, I consider that a sheriff should not allow an appeal unless there was some flaw in the procedure adopted by the hearing or he was satisfied that the hearing had not given proper consideration to some factor in the case". 89
Wilkinson and Norrie took from this dictum that two opposing points of view may each be "justified", from which it followed "that the sheriff cannot substitute his own opinion for that of the hearing merely because he disagrees with it but must, if the appeal is to be allowed, have some grounds on which the hearing's decision can justly be impugned". 90 The matter was revisited by Sheriff
Principal Nicholson in W v Schaffer 91 who said, in an appeal against an outcome decision of the hearing:
"The task facing a sheriff to whom an appeal has been taken is not to reconsider the evidence which was before the hearing with a view to making his own decision on that evidence. Instead, the sheriff's task is to see if there has been some procedural irregularity in the conduct of the case; to see whether the hearing has failed to give proper, or any, consideration to a relevant factor in the case; and in general to consider whether the decision reached by the hearing can be characterised as one which could not, upon any reasonable view, be regarded as being justified in all the circumstances of the case". There are, perhaps, two factors that might suggest that sheriffs ought not to afford such deference to the outcome decisions of the hearing. The first is that the sheriff to whom an appeal is taken is empowered (unusually for appeals) 96 to hear evidence in determining its outcome. The statute, however, explicitly provides that the sheriff is not obliged to hear evidence and it is likely to be appropriate only when the appeal is one of fact rather than of the justifiability of the outcome determined on uncontroverted facts. There is no process specified (beyond the hearing of evidence) by which the sheriff can conduct a sort of judicial children's hearing in order to reach his or her own welfare judgment.
The second potential argument against strong appellate deference in this context is the fact that the Scottish Government, introducing the Children's Hearings Bill, explicitly intended sheriffs to have more overview of hearings' decisions than they had hitherto been inclined to exercise. The Scottish Government's Policy Objective specified in its Policy Memorandum published with the Bill was to "make clear" that "the sheriff has available to him the power to conduct a wide review of the issues that a hearing considered". 97 This is clearly wider than a review of the facts upon which the hearing's decision was based. The Policy Memorandum goes on to state that this was designed to reinforce "the deliberate legislative intention of the 1995 Act" which was to provide that appeals to the sheriff can be wide in scope "such as that it can be effectively a rehearing of the matter". 98 , ss.180-184 gave sheriffs power to "review" decisions of the children's hearing, while the sheriff principal and the Court of Session were to hear "appeals" from the sheriff. But this substantial extension of the role of the sheriff was widely resisted and by the time the Bill was presented to the Parliament the existing rules for appeals to, rather than review by, the sheriff had been restored.
sheriffs since 1995 have eschewed a more proactive role in children's hearings cases). Other than the power to hear evidence, the "rehearing" by the sheriff is supported only in his or her power to substitute his or her own outcome -after a successful appeal under the 1995 Act 100 and now even after an unsuccessful appeal under the 2011 Act if the child's circumstances have changed since the time of the decision appealed against. 101 However, that power can be exercised only after the sheriff has determined whether the appeal is successful or not (that is, whether the hearing's decision was justified or not) and so cannot, in logic, determine the question of that success. The factors arguing in favour of reduced appellate deference in appeals against children's hearings' outcome decisions are not, it is submitted, sufficiently strong to overwhelm the orthodox approach described above and encapsulated in the interpretation of "justified" offered by Sheriff Principal Nicholson in W v Schaffer, which remains good law.
c. "Relevant person" appeals
There is another type of decision that a children's hearing 102 may make, and one that does not fall obviously within any of the categories of decision discussed earlier in this article. Since the coming into force of the 2011 Act, the children's hearing has been empowered to determine that an individual who does not fall within the definition of "relevant person" contained in s.200 of the 2011 Act is, nevertheless, to be deemed to be a relevant person. 103 Deeming an individual to be a relevant person is a crucial protection of that individual's participatory rights in the hearing process. The decision is certainly not a matter upon which the hearing can exercise any discretion: the Act is clear that if the statutory test -that the individual has (or has recently had) significant involvement in the upbringing of the child -is met then the individual "must" be deemed to be a relevant person. 104 Now, clearly this involves a matter of statutory interpretation but more directly it requires the hearing to make an assessment of the facts: has the individual's involvement been "significant"; was that an involvement in the child's "upbringing"; was it "recent"? A decision to deem an individual a relevant person might at first sight be perceived as being an outcome decision, because (i) it has immediate legal consequence -the conferral of participation rights on the individual who would not otherwise have such rights -and (ii) it is a decision that is independently appealable. But to regard a relevant person decision as an outcome decision seems structurally artificial. In truth, that decision is a step in the process towards determining the final outcome for the child, and the decision-making process requires, by the exercise of sound judgment, an appraisal of the facts to determine whether the statutory test is satisfied. In other words, it is an evaluative decision: an evaluation of facts is required in order to reach a factual conclusion.
Prior to the 2011 Act there was no statutory mechanism to deem a person who did not fall within the definition to be a relevant person and the correct application of the definition itself was regarded as an issue of fact. 105 Under the 2011 Act, the decision remains perceived by the Court of Session as being one of fact. In T v Locality Reporter 106 the Inner House described the deemed relevant person test as "a factual test, albeit a conclusion which had to be derived from other agreed or established primary facts". If the deemed relevant person decision were purely one of fact then the appellate tribunal (the sheriff) ought to defer to the hearing's conclusion in the same way that the Court of Session would defer to a sheriff's findings in fact. However, the statute itself precludes the decision being seen as purely one of fact because it explicitly provides a special appeal mechanism from the sheriff to the Court of Session on the point, but only on a point of law or in respect of any procedural irregularity 107 and not, therefore, on a point of fact. It follows that a children's hearing's deemed relevant person decision cannot be solely a "finding in fact" decision required is better seen as an evaluation of the facts in order to determine whether the statutory test has been satisfied, and this suggests that the appellate deference that a sheriff ought to show should be similar to that
shown by the Court of Session to the sheriff's evaluative decisions in respect of s.67 grounds of referral to the children's hearing. In fact, however, the primary determinant of the level of appellate deference is the statutory language: the ground is the same ground as that specified for dispositive decisions, that the conclusion reached by the hearing was not "justified". 108 It follows from this that the issue for the sheriff on appeal is whether the relevant person decision can be supported by the facts founded upon by the children's hearing, and not whether he or she would have come to the same conclusion as the hearing.
Indeed, it might be argued that this conclusion is stronger for relevant person decisions than for dispositive decisions of the hearing because, in sharp contradistinction to appeals to the sheriff under s.154 (against dispositive decisions), the sheriff has no power to hear evidence in a relevant person appeal. 109 This would seem to mean that a sheriff must accept the factual basis of the hearing's decision, though if these facts have changed the appeal court is able to take that into account. 110 A decision based upon facts that are incorrect, or no longer relevant, is unlikely to be "justified". The overall conclusion for relevant person appeals, however, is that the dictum of Sheriff continues to be applied in Scotland, both in residence and contact cases and in child protection cases. The attempt to limit this approach to "discretionary" decisions fails due to the impossibility of classification. It would, in addition, create pointless complexity to treat private law cases differently from public law cases because in both a non-automatic selection from a range of acceptable options is the task before the decision-maker. Because judgment requires to be exercised, and the law has conferred the power to make that judgment on the first instance tribunal, an appeal court ought never to overturn a lower court decision for no better reason than that it disagrees with the judgment made at first instance: appeals are not second chances to argue the same case.
Thirdly, children's hearings do not require a different approach to appellate deference but the structure of the system serves to emphasise the importance of ensuring that decisions are made by the body appointed by Parliament to make them. Allowing the first instance decision-maker (the hearing) a generous ambit of reasonable disagreement achieves this and, insofar as that generous ambit is encapsulated in the interpretation of the "not justified" test offered by Sheriff Principal Nicholson in W v Schaffer, that test, as a matter of principle, ought to be upheld.
